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The problems of defining a weapons system and obtaining a measure of 
effectiveness for the component parts in a gracefully degrading situation 
are not new. These problems have been addressed many times using many dif-
ferent techniques. In the past the ability to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the various components of a weapons system was not as critical as the 
ability to measure the overall effectiveness of the weapons system. How-
ever, with our increasingly high technology weapons systems, the contribu-
tions of the parts are critical to the effectiveness of the whole and these 
effectivenesses must be measured as a part of the overall evaluation of the 
weapons system. This is not a trivial task and becomes even more difficult 
when applied to a gracefully degrading system. 
This research was directed at developing and demonstrating a type 
methodology which can provide a measure of effectiveness for the communica-
tions system embedded in the Patriot Air Defense System. The methodology 
developed is probabilistic in nature and is based on the fact that communi-
cations can be modeled as network processes and these processes possess the 
Markov Property. 
Using the Markov Property, it is possible to develop the steady state 
probabilities for the communications systems and equate these to the percent-
ages of time the system will occupy these states over a long period of time. 
The stated model can now be modified and the resulting steady state proba-
bilities can be used for a sensitivity analysis of the model parameters, and 
consequently a basis for procurement and product improvement decisions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Description of the Problem  
Within the military community, it has long been a truism that a combat 
unit is evaluated based upon its ability to move, shoot, and communicate, 
treating these three functions as separate, mutually exclusive character-
istics which are desireable in the unit. With Today's highly complex, 
sophisticated military technology and increasingly automated battlefield, 
the unit which is unable to successfully perform any or all of these tasks 
simultaneously and to incorporate these functions into an integrated weapons 
system becomes a battlefield liability rather than an asset, unable to per-
form in a flexible, responsive manner to the rapidly changing situations 
generated on the modern, highly dynamic battlefield. It is therefore essen-
tial that, in order to more definitively evaluate unit capabilities and per-
formance, the integrated weapons systems of today and the future be evalu- 
ated not just on their abilities to perform the three main functions of muve, 
shoot, and communicate, but that a greater understanding be gained of the 
interaction of these three functions. For example, it is no longer sufficient 
for an artillery battery commander to be able to move his cannons to a piece 
of real estate, set up and place his first rounds on target. If he is unable 
to communicate, he does not know what type of mission he is shooting, what 
type of round to use, and with the longer range of the cannons of today, he 
cannot see where his rounds are impacting. This unit has become a liability 
on the battlefield rather than an asset. The problem then is to develop a 
measuring system whereby a unit's effectiveness is determined as a combina-
tion of what it can do, as well as what it cannot do. 
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B. Objective of the Project  
In this project, the objective is to propose a set of indices or measure-
ment standards whereby one of the functions of an integrated weapons system 
can be evaluated, analyzed and improved based upon the results of the evalu-
ation. 
The weapons system to be examined is the Patriot Air Defense Missile 
System, a new, all weather surface to air guided missile designed to re-
place*Nike Hercules and Improved Hawk in defeating the hostile air threat 
through the 1980's and beyond (131. As with all modern air defense weapons 
systems, the Patriot fire unit is extremely dependent upon communications 
to remain an effective element of the integrated air defense system. Be-
cause of this dependence upon communications to effectively perform its 
primary mission of defending point or area targets against hostile aircraft, 
a set of indices which represent the ability of a Patriot fire unit, battalion 
or group to communicate as part of its primary mission would then become a 
measurement standard against which one could evaluate the overall effective-
ness of a unit. 
C. Scope of the Project  
This project will be limited in scope to examining the system peculiar 
communications of a Patriot Air Defense Missile Battalion and its subordi-
nate firing batteries. Excluded from this discussion is the communications 
link from the Battalion Operations Center to the Group Operations Center. 
The factors which will be examined in determining the measurement standards 
for the unit are only those directly applicable to communications system 
operations and the associated equipment. To limit the scope of the project 
to a manageable level, such factors as weather, terrain, state of training 
and changing missions, although important, will be disregarded to establish 
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a clean environment within which the communications system can be examined. 
The ability of the communications system to perform its mission as measured 
against the predetermined standards will be evaluated by establishing a 
fixed model of the Patriot communications system and subjecting this model 
to graceful system degradation and analyzing the behavior of the system at 
each level of degradation. Within the context of this prdject, Graceful  
Degradation is defined as the stepwise reduction of a system's ability to  
perform its specified mission, rather than a sudden catastrophic failure  
which in one step destroys a system's capability. Rather than perform an 
exhaustive enumeration of all possible combinations and permutations of 
graceful degradation, a set scenario will be followed to demonstrate how 
graceful degradation affects system effectiveness and comments will be made 
as to means of forestalling these effects, thereby maintaining a higher stan-




A. Historical Approaches  
The concept of viewing units as weapons systems is not new. In 1955, 
Project WESCOM examined the problem of defining a weapons system, what it is, 
how it functions, why it functions and how to improve the manner in which it 
functions [14]. In examining the problem, the specific area in which Project 
WESCOM was interested was weapons system communications. The concepts pro-
posed by Project WESCOM were that it was no longer sufficient to view the 
communications of a weapons system as the means by which commanders talked 
to one another but rather that the entire weapons system must be decomposed 
into its various sub-units, each of these performing its own specialized 
functions. The communications system was then seen as a specialized sub-
system, functioning as an integral part of the weapons system. It was then 
observed that it was no longer adequate for a communications system to merely 
serve as a faithful transmitter and reproducer of input messages. Rather, 
the communications system must function as an integrated element of the 
weapons system, tailored to the specific needs of the weapons system. It then 
proposed that the effectiveness of the communications system could only be 
measured in terms of its contributions to the effectiveness of the weapons 
system. 
In 1956, George H. Clement presented a paper entitled "Weapons System 
Philosophy," in which this concept of viewing units and collections of units 
as weapons systems was further refined and defined [2]. One strong point 
which was made was the function of scale when viewing a weapons system. At 
each level of interest, functions and their relative importance vary dependent 
upon the scope of the project. For example, to the division commander, the 
functioning of.one specific platoon in a given operation is not a major issue; 
however, to the commander of the company to which that platoon is organic, the 
functioning of the platoon is of great importance. The thrust of the paper 
then is to look at each element of the weapons system and evaluate it as it 
affects the functioning of the weapons system, that it may not be necessary 
for a function to be absolutely perfect, that in viewing the function with 
the weapons system as a backdrop, less than perfect is entirely acceptable. 
Once again, the efficiency of a sub-system is seen as its contribution to 
the efficiency of the weapons system as a whole. 
In a paper published in 1957 entitled "The Flow and Functions of Com-
munications in Weapons Systems," the actual purposes of communications systems 
as part of a weapons system were examined in detail. Here were specified in 
precise definitions the tasks and responsibilities which were placed upon 
communications systems as integrated into a weapons system [3]. 
As part of an effort aimed at force modernization, in 1969 a paper was 
presented entitled "Force Structure Planning: Determination of Micro-Weapon 
Structure." In this paper was presented the need for developing a methodology 
whereby a micro-structure of weapons systems based upon the functions of sur-
veillance, fire power, communications and mobility could be expressed. This 
structure would then be used as a means of evaluating weapons systems perform-
ing the same general and specific functions. The results of these evaluations 
would then be used as a basis for analytical comparison when deciding upon 
weapons systems for procurement. 
It is therefore seen that there has long been recognized the need for a 
means whereby a weapons system could be decomposed into its component parts 
or functions and that these component parts then be evaluated not just as 
separate entities but by their contributions to the weapons system as a whole. 
B. Modeling Communications  
To the systems analyst, when a system must be analyzed, if possible, the 
system should be viewed by a mathematical representation or model of the sys-
tem. By developing a mathematical model of the system, the analyst is often 
better able to see the system in its purest terms, without any fog or confus-
ion introduced by extraneous or incorrect factors and data. In an effort to 
provide a model for the communications system, the model which can be most 
readily seen as analogous is the network. The concept of modeling integrated 
systems as networks has received considerable attention. This is because sys-
tems which can be modeled as networks possess a special mathematical structure 
which make them easier to understand and solve. The study of network flow 
problems has produced numerous solution techniques and there exist a wide 
variety of algorithms which are available as computer software packages to 
solve network problems. 
Basically a network flow problem consists of a set of activities or nodes 
with a system of interconnecting arcs or links! The network flow problem then 
becomes a question of solving for commodities (such as information or material) 
which are transferred on the arcs from node to node. The nodes can be any 
activity such as warehouses, data processing centers or other centers of 
activity. From the above very simplistic definition, it can readily be seen 
that a communications system can be modeled as a network. Of the many algo-
rithms available for solving the network flow problem, some are too restrictive 
in their application for solving the communications, air defense network prob-
lems. Examples of these constrained algorithms are the Assignment Problem, 
the Transportation Algorithm and the Transshipment Problem. Each of these 
algorithms is a very powerful tool in solving network flow problems, but they 
are restricted to solving problems of a very special structure and hence do 
not extend to the generalized network problem. 
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Another algorithm of interest in solving the communications network 
problem is the construction of a Minimum Spanning Tree (MST). A MST is a 
set of arcs generated to connect a given node to a set of nodes using the 
minimum resource on the arcs, be that resource time, dollars, or any other 
quantifiable measure. This is readily adaptable to the air defense communi-
cations network by viewing the Battalion Operations Center (BOC) as the 
starting node, the batteries as the other nodes in the node set and the com-
munications data links as the connecting arcs in the system. This algorithm 
is useful because the MST can be continuously updated as the system is grace-
fully degraded, thereby showing how the system can be reconfigured to meet 
mission requirements and further indicating first occurrence of failure to 
obtain a MST, therein showing failure of the communications system to accom-
plish its mission. This MST problem expands to a Maximal Flow Problem (MFP) 
by including all possible spanning trees to the problem, thereby generating 
all possible arcs over which a flow may pass. In a research paper entitled 
"Graceful Degradation of Air Defense Capabilities" by James Lovell in 1982, 
it was demonstrated that the effects of graceful degradation upon an air de- 
fense network can be measured in terms of costs assigned to target allocations 
for a gracefully degrading network. As part of the cost function, the proba-
bility of communication was included as an integral part, with costs being 
inversely proportional to the probability of successful communications. 
Each of the network algorithms possesses the advantages of ease of 
application when modeling a communications network, as well as speed and 
ease of computation using the efficient algorithms coded on a high-speed com-
puter. Unfortunately, none of these techniques are able to provide a measure 
of efficiency for the Patriot communications systems, due to some system 
characteristics which are further discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Therefore, it is necessary to look beyond these standard network repre-
sentations of communications systems to find a model which is capable of pro-
viding a general measure of effectiveness for a communications network. 
Because a system's effectiveness cannot be considered as deterministic, 
where all required data is known and all actions are perfectly predictable, 
the system should be evaluated based upon the probabilities of specified re-
sults using the probabilities of certain actions occurring. This viewpoint, 
when modeling a communications system, brings about the consideration of 
probabilistic or stochastic models. Of the numerous stochastic models 
available, many have as their basis the application of the Markov Property. 
This Markov Property, as a general statement, is that the future state of a 
system is dependent only upon the present state, not the past. Therefore, 
the Markov Property is also known as the Memoryless Property [15]. In a dis-
sertation written by Francis A. Gay entitled "Performance Modelling for 
Gracefully Degrading Systems," Dr. Gay addressed the issue of evaluating the 
performance of gracefully degrading systems based upon Markov Processes [4]. 
The gracefully degrading systems modeled by Dr. Gay are those which are 
designed to provide a high grade of service by reconfiguring the system and/or 
reallocating resources when a failure occurs. Two models based upon Markov 
processes were developed. The one model was a "capacity" model, in which the 
effect of failures was considered as to the system's capabilities or capacities. 
The other model was the "workload" model, which considers the system's ability 
to satisfy its computational demands. The outputs of these models were the 
proportion of time a system spends in various degraded modes of capacity or 
the amount of throughput or work performed by a system in degraded modes. 
This dissertation also demonstrated that the models produced identical results 
when the systems were modeled as discrete time Markov processes or continuous 
time Markov processes. 
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As was stated earlier, there exist many types of models available to 
represent the communications systems, from deterministic models such as net-
works to stochastic models, such as the Narkov process. It therefore falls 
to the modeler to determine which model to use or if a new model is to be de-
veloped. 
C. Communications Survivability  
Once it is known how well a communications network works, one of the 
goals of a model is to take this evaluation and utilize the results to de-
sign communications systems which are superior to those which already exist. 
To do this, it is not sufficient just to know how a system works, it is also 
necessary to know what actions or events will cause a system to cease working. 
Those factors which affect a communications network survivability are referred 
to as system vulnerabilities. 
In 1967, Dr. Howard Frank presented a paper entitled "Vulnerability of 
Communication. Networks," in which he explored some of the factors which affect 
communication survivability [6]. In presenting these factors, Dr. Frank 
further discussed the difficulties inherent in making quantitative rather than 
qualitative judgements on system survivability due to the problems in develop-
ing exact mathematical representations of the actions and interactions of 
all the factors which impact on system performance. Dr. Frank demonstrated 
how the concept of modeling survivability of relatively simple networks is 
feasible but that extending these concepts to complex systems becomes ex-
tremely difficult due to the combinatorics involved. When a system becomes 
complex, with a high degree of interconnectivity, the sheer number of possi-
ble combinations which must be enumerated and investigated becomes enormous. 
For this reason, true definitive work in representing system survivability is 
still limited to relatively simple networks. 
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As a follow-on, Dr. Frank, along with Dr. Ivan Frisch, presented a paper 
in 1970 entitled "Analysis and Design of Survivable Networks," in which the 
issue of analyzing networks was specifically addressed [5]. Of particular 
interest in this paper was the discussion of the problems involved in ana-
lyzing networks due to the division of network survivability into nearly dis-
joint areas: deterministic survivability and probabilistic survivability. 
In the deterministic case, the attacker is assumed to have complete knowledge 
about the system being attacked and also uses a deterministic attack strategy. 
In the probabilistic problem, the adversary may have only partial knowledge 
about the network or he may employ a randomized attack strategy. 
Because attack and network models are operated separately, typical sur-
vival criteria for a network can be classified as either deterministic or prob-
abilistic. A network is considered to "survive" an attack if 1) all points 
can communicate with one another; 2) there are flow paths between specified 
pairs of points; 3) the number of points in the largest connected section ex-
ceeds a specified threshold; or 4) the shortest surviving path between each 
pair of points is no longer than a specified length. In conducting a deter-
ministic analysis, the objective might be to determine if these criteria 
are met subject to a known attack. When conducting a probabilistic analysis, 
the objective might well be determining the probabilities any or all of these 
criteria will be satisfied. 
When the problem involves modeling and analysis of networks in a proba-
bilistic manner, many difficulties are encountered which are not present in 
deterministic models. Among these are the problems caused by correlation of 
events, which will effect the expected probabilities of joint events. Another 
problem is caused when branch or node failures have different probabilities. 
Because of the combinatorics involved in analyzing these multinomial distri-
butions, the exact computational solution becomes almost impossible to obtain, 
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with the degree of difficulty increasing proportional to the complexity and 
size of the network. Therefore, when analyzing networks as a probabilistic 
model, it is usual to assume equal probabilities on the arcs or nodes and 
treat the random variables as following the binomial distribution. This then 
simplifies the problem to the point where a solution is obtainable. 
In addition to the theoretics presented by Dr. Frank and Dr. Frisch, 
they also present the concept of using simulations, in particular Monte Carlo 
Simulations utilizing modern, high-speed computers, to provide repeated runs 
of the models under investigation utilizing varying degrees of graceful de-
gradation and attack strategies to observe how the system behaves. These re-
sults can then be analyzed to obtain an average or expected result of the 
system. 
This idea of applying simulation to network analysis when investigating 
system survivability was used by Dr. Edith Martin in her dissertation entitled 
"Operational Survivability in Gracefully Degrading Distributed Processing 
Systems" [9]. In this work Dr. Martin investigated which factors were 
present in a model designed to explain the manner in which a distributed pro-
cessing system functioned as a gracefully degrading network. To do this, Dr. 
Martin, applying the principles of experimental design, developed an experi-
ment in which sufficient samples of experimental results were obtained to 
enable factors to be isolated and analyzed. A complex computer simulation 
of a network representation was then run to obtain the sample cases and then 
these samples were analyzed using Linear Regression Analysis, a basic ana-
lytical tool in operations research. From this analysis, using an initial 
set of 32 candidate regressors, a model was developed, composed of 23 vari-
ables, which functioned best overall as both an explanatory and prediction 
model. In examining the correlation matrix developed for the model, it is 
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obvious that there is a high degree of multicollinearity in the model. This 
is not surprising when considering the number of variables present in the model 
and the variables description. However, as the model appears to explain and 
predict the behavior of the system, the multicollinearity is not a problem 
and need not be unduely emphasized when discussing the results of the work. 
From this work, Dr. Martin proposed ten results or propositions which 
serve to explain why some networks survive and gracefully degrade while 
other networks quickly approach catastrophic failure. Among these results 
are several which seem applicable when discussing the Patriot communications 
system. The first of these hypotheses to be considered is that the more 
nodes in the distributed network, the more likely that performance is satis- 
factory. In other words, the more nodes available, the more resources avail-
able to perform the mission and if one or more are lost, the remainder will 
continue to perform the mission. 
The second of the hypotheses to be considered is that as communications 
requirements approach total system capabilities, the likelihood of satis-
factory performance decreases. 
A third hypothesis to consider is that the higher the distributed net-
work connectivity, the greater the probability the network will survive. 
This basically says that greater connectivity permits more alternative routes 
as primary arcs are lost. 
Another hypothesis of interest is that failure to properly assign the 
application system to the distributed network initially makes satisfactory 
gracefully degrading performance difficult. This states that the system 
must be designed and tailored to meet its needs and not applied blindly. A 
system which is established after considering the requriements to be placed 
upon the system will be more efficient than any system not so established. 
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The final hypothesis considered concerns the higher the level of appli-
cation system connectivity the poorer the prospects for satisfactory perfor-
mance. What this states is that as nodes and arcs become more specialized, 
the possibilities for survival are reduced. 
The works just presented represent only a small portion of the research 
which has been done in the areas of modeling and analyzing communications 
networks. However, these are sufficient to introduce the concepts which will 




A. Communications Needs  
As was indicated previously, the Patriot Air Defense Missile System is 
extremely dependent upon communications for operational effectiveness. This 
dependence is in both the area of command and control and the area of oper-
ational readiness [12]. 
1. Operational Readiness 
Because the Patriot missile is a command launched, command guided missile 
during all but the final few seconds of its flight, the Patriot firing battery 
can be rated fully operationally ready only if all of its system peculiar com-
munications equipment is properly functioning. If there is any loss of com- 
munications capability, the system is degraded, to what level is dependent 
upon which communications circuits are nonoperational. Details as to which 
circuits perform specific functions are presented later in this chapter. 
2. Command and Control 
Current U.S. Army tactical doctrine proposes that in air defense opera-
tions, control of air defense fires be retained at the highest level possible, 
consistent with the current tactical situation, while execution of the air 
defense mission be delegated to the lowest possible level, consistent with 
command capabilities [4]. This doctrine of centralized control, decentralized 
execution places enormous demands upon the air defense communications system. 
The communications system must maintain both voice and data link capability 
utilizing radios only to enable controlling headquarters to disseminate states 
and stages of alert, air defense warnings, weapons control orders and the 
many other standard operating procedures required to control air defense wea-
pons systems in defending area and point targets while precluding the 
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engagement of friendly aircraft. In addition, these communications systems 
are utilized by the firing units to report their current status and, when 
engaging allocated targets, to insure proper target correlation with the 
assigning headquarters prior to launching a missile. As can readily be 
seen, due to the dependence on communications for command and control, as 
communications circuits are lost, efficiency is reduced. 'If radio data 
links are non-operational, some information and all automatic target allo-
cation capabilities are lost, thereby degrading the capabilities of the 
system. If some of the voice circuits are lost, system capabilities are 
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further degraded, requiring more and greater adjustments to continue the 
mission. When all communications with higher headquarters and adjacent 
units are lost, the unit is forced to operate autonomously, the most inef-
ficient manner of operation for an air defense unit. That is because the 
unit is forced to function alone, rather than as an element of an integrated 
system, receiving and passing orders and information, defending and being 
defended. As can be seen, as the communications of a Patriot fire unit with 
its higher headquarters and adjacent units are gracefully degraded, the unit 
operates less efficiently. 
B. Patriot System Communications Equipment  
1. Battery Level Communications 
Within the firing battery, system peculiar communications is of two 
types. Hard wire is used to provide data link communications between the 
Equipment Control Station (ECS) and the multifunction phased array radar. 
It is over this hard wire communications circuit that commands are given to 
the radar, missile alerts are transmitted and Track via Missile (TVM) guid- 
ance commands are relayed to in-flight missiles. This hard wire circuit also 
serves as the information data link for targets which are being tracked 
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between the radar and the Weapon Control Computer (WCC) in the ECS. The 
cables which carry the data are extremely durable, cannot be jammed by elec-
tronic counter measures (ECM) and cannot be monitored to divulge intelligence 
to the enemy. They therefore provide a reliable and secure means of communi-
cation for the Fire Control Section (FCS). There are two drawbacks to the 
use of cables for the sole means of data links. The first disadvantage is 
that equipment dispersal is limited by cable length (itself limited by tech-
nical considerations such as signal loss). The second disadvantage is that 
due to the size, weight, and cost of cables, it is not practical for a unit 
to carry spare cables with it, thereby making it possible for a unit to be 
rendered nonoperational should the cables be damaged, lost or destroyed. 
The second type of Patriot peculiar communications system used within 
the firing battery is the Data Link Terminal (DLT), a VHF radio link between 
the ECS and the Launching Stations (LS). This DLT, which exists from the 
ECS to each of the LS (normally 9) in the firing battery, is used to trans- 
mit launcher data, missile prelaunch data and the firing data between the WCC 
and the LS for each missile on the launcher. Because more than one LS is 
available, so long as the VHF radio in the ECS is operational, there can be 
a graceful degradation of system capabilities due to loss of a LS(s) or 
loss of communications to an LS(s). Because data transmission is via radio 
positioning requirements are that line of sight with the DLT antenna on the 
ECS must be maintained but much greater freedom so far as dispersal of equip-
ment is possible, as this is not governed by cable length. Normal consider-
ations for displacement of LS from the ECS is 90 to 1000 meters. However, 
along with the greater flexibility of positioning provided by radio arise 
some disadvantages. Because the data link is via radio, the possibility of 
jamming must be considered. Although this is slight, it is an area to be 
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considered. Of more serious concern is that with the radar in the FCS and 
all the radio communications being used, the battery presents an extremely 
large radio frequency (RF) signature which can be used by the enemy to pin-
point its location for avoidance, suppression or distruction. 
In addition to the system peculiar communications equipment discussed 
previously, the Patriot battery has organic to it numerous radio and wire 
communications assets to provide internal command and control of unit oper-
ations, to include the organic stinger teams. However, none of this equip-
ment is capable of substituting for the system peculiar equipment required 
for the air defense mission. See Appendix 1 for Battery level systems com-
munication requirements and configurations. 
2. Battery-Battalion Intercommunications Equipment 
The sole type of communications available for battery-battalion inter-
communications under anticipated tactical deployment is radio. Although 
under special circumstances such as fixed emplacement or limited deployment, 
wire could be used for communications, under typical deployment Patriot mo-
bility and dispersion preclude the use of wire due to time and distance con-
straints. Therefore, wire will not be considered when analyzing battery-
battalion intercommunications. The systems peculiar communications euqipment 
which provides battery-battalion command and control communications circuits, 
both voice and data link, are located in the Information Coordination Central 
(ICC) at battalion level and ECS at battery level. In addition to the ICC 
and the ECS' s, there are two other major end items which are integral to the 
battery-battalion communication's network. These are the Communications Relay 
Set (CRS), of which each battalion has four, and the Antenna Mast Set (AMS), 
one of which is associated with each ICC, ECS, and CRS in the system. From 
this point forward, whenever an ICC, CRS, or ECS is mentioned, that reference 
will include the AMS. 
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The battalion communications network is designed to provide reliable, 
flexible communications, easily and quickly adapting to any tactical situ-
ation. The major feature of the battalion communications system which pro-
motes this reliability is the multi-routing capability. Each ECS and ICC 
contain three UHF radio sets, while each CRS has four UHF radio sets. This 
gives each of these major end items the capability to receive, transmit and 
retransmit any message on all of their organic UHF radios. This provides 
the battalion communications network with the capability of forming many 
possible radio links, each receiving, transmitting and automatically retrans-
mitting any message received. All messages which are received are checked 
for content and then automatically retransmitted. If the message originated 
at the receiving unit is addressed to the receiving unit or was previously 
received, it is not retransmitted. This automatic retransmission of messages 
over all existing links in the communications network provides several paths 
over which a unit may receive a message, thereby increasing the probability 
of the unit receiving the message. On each AMS are located four parabolic 
directional antennas. For the ICC and the ECS's only three of these antennas 
are in use, for the CRS's, all are in use. Each of these antennas is re-
motely controlled from inside the item of equipment with which it is associ-
ated and is operated in conjunction with just one UHF radio, communicating 
with just one particular unit. This feature of directional transmission, 
combined with multi-routing certain technical aspects of the message for- 
mat and secure encryption transmission are efforts to reduce the effects of 
electronic warfare, both interception and interference, from disrupting the 
Patriot battalion communications network. As stated previously, the heavy 
dependence upon radios for communication, combined with the radar emissions, 
provides a large radio frequency signature for the units, exposing them to 
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overt and covert enemy action. This danger is further increased by the dis-
persal limitation of the AMS from the communications shelters imposed by 
cable lengths. To provide a backup capability to the AMS, the ICC and ECS's 
have attached to the communications shelters corner reflector antennas which 
are useful for short distance transmissions. In addition to other placement 
considerations when deploying the battalion, line of sight must be maintained 
from antenna to antenna. One of the prime functions of the CRS's is to act 
as relay stations when line of sight cannot be maintained between ICC and 
ECS's. 
As a backup to the system peculiar communications equipment, additional 
voice radio circuits are available utilizing both AM and FM radios. Although 
there exists no backup data link capability, these backup voice circuits 
would enable the dissemination of state and stages of alert, weapons con- 
trol orders and other necessary command and control information. The problems 
introduced by using these circuits are that all target allocations must be 
made manually, which is slow, inefficient, and sometimes inaccurate. In 
addition, this places a heavier volume of traffic on these circuits, which 
are routinely used for administrative and tactical information transmission. 
See Appendix 2 for a typical battalion communications network configuration. 
C. Battalion-Group/Adjacent Battalion Communications  
As the Patriot system is currently configured, only the ICC has the 
capability of establishing UHF voice and data link communications with Group 
and adjacent battalions. This is because only the ICC has the requisite 
equipment to convert messages received from outside the battalion into data 
which is usable by the Patriot system. There is therefore a sole entry/exit 
point for system-usable communications such as target allocations. The CRS's 
are capable of retransmitting the messages between the ICC and Group/adjacent 
battalions, but only that, the messages cannot be converted into usable for-
mat at the CRS's. 
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Should the systems peculiar communications link from ICC to group fail, 
there are of course AM and FM radio circuits available to continue communi-
cations, but these are limited, as stated previously for the battery-battalion 
communications. 
Being aware that this situation exists, when discussing communications 
within the battalion, it will be assumed that communications as needed exist 
between the ICC and group/adjacent battalion. This is because should the ICC 
become nonoperational, there is no longer a need for a battalion level model 




In selecting a model for use in developing a measure of effectiveness 
for the Patriot communications system, the features of the models presented 
in Chapter II must be considered. As stated previously, the two most com-
monly used models are networks and Markov Processes. Each of these model-
ing techniques has inherent advantages and disadvantages. The major advan-
tages to network models are that there are numerous solution algorithms 
available and that the models and the solutions have considerable intuitive 
appeal. It is simple to view a communications system as a network and a 
solution which provides specified quantities on arcs and nodes is easily 
grasped. Unfortunately, the major disadvantage of a network model is that 
it becomes difficult to relate the solution to a measure of efficiency as 
adapting a scale rating to flow quantities is not an easy task, especially 
in a continuously degrading situation. 
Conversely, the major advantage to a Markov Process model is that the 
solution is readily adaptable to a fixed scale evaluation scheme as the 
states of the process can readily function as the scale. The major dis-
advantages to using a Markov Process model are in defining the states of 
the process and determining the values of the probabilities to be used. 
Also, because the Markov Process is an entirely probabilistic model, the 
difficulties inherent to probabilistic models as discussed in Chapter II 
are encountered. 
Because, as Dr. Gay demonstrated in his dissertation, a model based on 
Markov Processes illustrates the capability of a system or in a probabilistic 
sense the capacity of a system, which is a measure of its effectiveness, the 
Markov Process model will be used in this paper. 
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A. Markov Processes  
Before delineating the specifics of the model as applied to the Patriot 
communications system, the general properties of the Markov Process to be 
used will be explained. The particular Markov Process to be used in the 
model is the Markov Chain (MC). An MC can be well-defined in two cases, 
the discrete case and the continuous case. The difference in the two cases 
is that of occurrence of transitions or changes to the system. In the dis-
crete case, transitions occur only at discrete, defined time intervals while 
for the continuous case, transitions occur continuously, the probabilities 
of transitions being defined as a Poisson Process, governed by the Poisson 
Distribution. For this paper, the system will be modeled as a discrete time 
Markov Chain. Although the requirement that transitions occur at discrete 
time intervals may seem too restrictive, Dr. Gay demonstrated in his disser-
tation that, when considering long-run probabilities, for gracefully degrad-
ing systems, discrete and continuous MC's are equivalent. 
There are several advantages to using discrete time MC's. The first is 
that there is no need to demonstrate that the failures occurring in the grace-
fully degrading system are Poisson Processes. Although this could be done, 
by not using failure probabilities governed by a particular probability dis-
tribution the results will be of a nonparametric nature and will be more 
general in their application. Also, because a discrete MC is being used, 
the MC contains a special structure which simplifies the calculations in 
obtaining the long-run probabilities. 
The special structure which offers ease of solution is that, by limiting 
the possible states into which the system can transition to a finite number 
and having the MC meet several class properties, the long-run or steady state 
probabilities can be solved for as a set of simultaneous linear equations. 
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These special properties which the system must meet are that, in addition to 
a finite number of states, the MC must be irreducible, positive recurrent, 
and aperiodic. The requirement for irreducibility means that any state must 
be accessible from any other state. Positive recurrence merely states that 
the system must be capable of transitioning from any state back to that state 
in less than an infinite number of transitions. The requirement for aperiodic 
states that within the MC there is no underlying structure which prevents the 
system from being in any state after a sufficiently long period of time. That 
is to say, there is no cycle present in the transition probabilities which 
prevents the system from transitioning from one state to a given state in a 
specified number of transitions. If these requirements are met, then the 
long-run or steady state probabilities for the MC can be obtained. These 
steady state probabilities define the probability the system is in a particu-
lar state after a long period of time or these steady state probabilities 
can be viewed as the proportion of time a system is in a given state over 
a long period of time. 
The typical representation of a Markov Chain for discrete time processes 
is that of a square matrix. This square matrix is commonly referred to as 
the one-step transition matrix. That is because the entries within the matrix 
represent the probability of a transition from the state as indicated by the 
row label to the state as indicated by the column label in one step or one 
transition only. This transition matrix has several properties which it 
must satisfy. All entries must be greater than or equal to zero (0) but 
less than or equal to one (1). The sum of the probabilities for each row 
must equal one (1). If these requirements are not met, the matrix is not 
stochastic in that the row values would fail to completely sepcify the proba-
bility distribution. 
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From the transition matrix the steady state probabilities are calculated. 
Because the transient behavior of the MC is of little interest, in that inter-
mediate transient probabilities and rate of convergence to steady state are 
of no real importance to the model, the steady state probabilities are cal-
culated directly by solving a set of simultaneous linear equations. Once the 
steady state probabilities have been calculated and their impact analyzed, 
the system can then be modified in an effort to shift the steady state proba-
bilities as needed to achieve more desireable results. This is done by modi-
fying the underlying structure of the system that determines the transition 
matrix. 
B. Model Definition  
As was stated previously, when utilizing a Markov Process to model a net-
work, by proper selection and definition of the possible states of the process, 
the steady state probabilities represent the proportion of time the system 
spends in the states over a long period of time. These steady state probabili-
ties can then be viewed as the measures of effectiveness for the system. In 
this paper, as the communications for the battery and for the battery-battalion 
are being modeled, two different sets of states must be defined, one for each 
model. 
1. Battery Communications 
In modeling the battery level system peculiar communications, it becomes 
necessary to differentiate between radio and hard wire communications. As 
stated previously, the hard wire communications are used in the fire control 
area. The unit maintains no spares on hand for these cables and each cable 
must be fully operational for the system to be operational. As there is no 
graceful degradation possible for this portion of the communications system, 
there is no real need to develop a stochastic model to represent its effectiveness. 
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This portion of the communications system either works or it doesn't work, 
with probability as developed from reliability data. 
The radio communications, used to provide pre-flight and firing data 
for the missiles on the launching stations, is a system which can be grace-
fully degraded and as such is of interest to this paper. This model, be-
cause the communications network it represents is extremely basic, is a 
very simple model to develop and understand. As an introduction to the 
technique being employed, this is beneficial in that using the model in a 
simple case illustrates the use of the model in a context which is easily 
understood. To apply the model, the transition matrix must be derived. To 
do this, the states of the system must be defined so that probabilities can 
be assigned in the transition matrix. As was stated previously, by properly 
defining the states of the system, the states and their associated steady 
state probabilities can represent the efficiency or effectiveness of the 
system. The states which identify the capabilities of the system are defined 
by the user of the model and have meaning only when applied to the definitions. 
For this model, the states of the system are defined as follows: 
State 1: The system is 85% or more operational. This means that communi-
cations are operational to seven (7) or eight (8) launchers (for a standard 
battery). 
State 2: The system is 60% or more operational but less than 85%. This 
means that communications are operational to five (5) or six (6) launchers. 
State 3: The system is 25% or more operational but less than 60%. This 
means that communications exist to two (2), three (3), or four (4) launchers. 
State 4: The system is less than 25% operational. This means that communi-
cations either do not exist or exist to only one (1) launcher. 
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Admittedly, the definition of these states is arbitrary on the part of 
the modeler, but they serve to give a fixed scale value to the capacity or 
efficiency of the battery. Any disagreement as to definitions for the states 
could be resolved and the transition matrix generated from the definitions 
modified accordingly. A sample case using this model and one variation to 
this model are presented in Chapter V. 
2. Battery-Battalion Communications 
In defining the model to be used for Battery-Battalion Communications, 
care must be taken to ensure the model is not overly simplified, as this 
would provide an unrealistic appraisal of the true nature of system while a 
model which is too complex would be of little use as the solution would be 
difficult to obtain and understand. For these reasons, it becomes essential 
that the model be developed to meet the needs of the user, rather than trying 
to develop a genralized model which can be used to obtain any desired infor-
mation. Once again, due to the complexity of the problem, the probabilities 
must be treated as binomially distributed. For the battery model, this was 
not unreasonable as unit deployment considerations are such that there should 
not be that much variation in probabilities of communications from the ECS 
to any particular LS. When considering the Battery-Battalion model, this assump-
tion becomes suspect as significant differences in range, terrain, weather, 
and the multitude of other factors which affect the probabilities of communi-
cations are not considered. However, it can be argued that of the factors 
which have been omitted, some would tend to cancel out others so the assump-
tion of a binomial distribution may not be that bad after all. 
For the model to be used for the Battery-Battalion Communications System, 
the states of the system are defined as follows: 
State 1: The system is defined as being in state 1 when every battery has all 
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three UHF radios successfully sending and receiving radio transmissions. 
State 2: The system is defined as being in state 2 when every battery has 
at least two UHF radios successfully sending and receiving radio transmis-
sions. 
State 3: The system is defined as being in state 3 when every battery has 
at least one UHF radio successfully sending and receiving radio transmis-
sions. 
State 4: The system is defined as being in state 4 when at least one battery 
has no radios sending or receiving successfully. This means that at least 
one battery has been forced to operate autonomously due to lack of communi-
cations with the battalion or adjacent firing batteries. 
As was stated for the Battery model, these definitions of states are 
arbitrary on the part of the modeler and can be changed to meet the purpose 
of the study being initiated. However, they do serve the intended purpose 
in this model of providing a fixed scale against which the ability of the 
system to perform its assigned mission can be evaluated. A sample case using 




In demonstrating how the models of the communications systems would be 
implemented, it is necessary to use fictional probability data for radio 
transmission capabilities. This is brought about by the security implica-
tions of using real life reliability data in conjunction with a model which 
represents system capabilities. Therefore, the probabilities to be used in 
this chapter are for demonstration only and do not represent actual data. 
To use the model for actual data, all that is required is to substitute 
actual probabilities for the fictional probabilities used in the samples pre-
sented below. 
A. Battery Model  
As previously stated, the battery model consists of defining the states 
of the transition matrix for the Markov Chain in terms of the number of oper-
ational communications links to the battery's launching stations. For the 
purpose of illustration, the probability of a transmission being successfully 
completed between the ECS and the LS is .7, therefore the probability of an 
unsuccessful transmission between the ECS and teh LS is .3. For the initial 
case being presented, no repair is possible, therefore, there is no oppor-
tunity for reconstitution of the battery after losses are suffered. In 
Appendix 3, the tree diagrams are shown illustrating the calculations for the 
various probabilities which are used in the transition matrix. The transi-
tion matrix and the sets of simultaneous linear equations are also shown. 
Finally, the solution to the system is shown. Here, the solution is that 
when the system reaches steady state after a sufficiently long period of 
time, the probability that the system will be in states 1, 2, or 3 is zero, 
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while the probability that the system will be in state 4 is 1. These results 
are no surprise as it is intuitive that any system which is incapable of being 
repaired, with a positive probability of failure, will eventually fail, becom-
ing totally nonoperational. 
As a variation on this and to demonstrate one of the uses of the model, 
using the same fictional probability data, the transition matrix for the sys-
tem is calculated with repair for each link possible during a transition step. 
In defining the probabilities for the repair per transition, it is assumed 
that the probability of a nonoperational communications circuit becoming oper-
ational is .6, while the probability of a nonoperational circuit remaining 
nonoperational is .4. The transition probabilities are calculated as shown 
in the tree diagrams in Appendix 4. In addition, Appendix 4 also shows the 
system of simultaneous linear equations and the steady state probabilities 
which result from solving these equations. As opposed to the steady state 
probabilities for the no repair possible model, the repair possible model 
demonstrates a shift in steady state probabilities from a guaranteed failure 
to positive probabilities for remaining in states which correspond to higher 
states of unit capability. 
B. Battery-Battalion Model  
As stated in Chapter IV, the Battery-Battalion. Model consists of defining 
the states of the transition matrix for the Markov Chain in terms of the num-
ber of operational communications links for each battery in the battalion. 
For the purpose of illustration, the probability of a communications link being 
operational for the batteries is .7, while the probability of the communi-
cations link being nonoperational is .3. For the initial case being presented, 
it is assumed that there is no possibility of repair or reallocation of assets 
within the system. Once a communications link becomes nonoperational, it re-
mains nonoperational, precluding any attempts to reconstitute the communications 
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network after losses of capability are suffered. In Appendix 5 the tree dia-
grams are shown illustrating the calculations to obtain the various proba-
bilities which are placed in the one step transition matrix. The one step 
transition matrix and the set of simultaneous linear equations from which the 
steady state probabilities are solved for are also shown. Solving this set 
of simultaneous linear equations by any of the numerous techniques available 
yields the solution as shown. 
As was the case for the Battery Model, when no repairs are permitted, 
the steady state probabilities for states 1, 2, and 3 are equal to zero 
while the steady state probability for state 4 is equal to 1. This means 
that in a system where the component parts have a positive probability of 
failure but there is no probability of repair or reconstitution, the system 
must ultimately fail with probability equal to 1. 
As a variation to the Battery-Battalion Model presented, using the same 
fictional probability data, the system will be modeled where repair of non-
operational communications links are permitted in one transition. The prob-
ability of a nonoperational link becoming operational is .6 with the probability 
of a nonoperational link remaining nonoperational is .4. The transition 
probabilities are calculated as shown in the tree diagrams in Appendix 6. 
addition, Appendix 6 also shows the system of simultaneous linear equations 
and the steady state probabilities which result form solving these equations. 
As shown, when the steady state probabilities are solved for, the system 
is now capable of remaining in states other than guaranteed failure. This 
shift in steady state probabilities is a means by which the effect of repair-
ability on a system can be measured. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the material presented herein, it has been shown that it is entirely 
possible to model air defense communications systems as a successively degrad-
ing system. Through the use of a probabilistic model based upon Markov Pro-
cesses, the ability of this system to perform its assigned functions within 
the context of the weapons system as a whole can be measured. This ability 
of the model to provide defined measurement data as to the system's capabili-
ties makes it possible to quantify gracefully degrading systems. By determin-
ing the steady state probabilities of the system as defined by the states of 
the system, it is possible to identify the state or level of capability at 
which the system is currently operating and furthermore, to determine what 
proportion of time the system will operate at this state. 
In the variations to the two models presented, it was demonstrated that 
by varying only one system characteristic, the whole nature of the system 
could be transformed. In the examples presented, by permitting the nonoper-
ational communications links to be repairable with positive probability in 
one transition, the models were transformed from guaranteed failure models 
to systems where positive probabilities existed for operating at higher states 
of the model. It is of additional interest that the model indicated that 
in excess of 75% of the time, the system would operate as a degraded system. 
Having now shown that the system can indeed be modeled probabilistically 
and measures of effectiveness assigned to the model to quantify system degra-
dations, the question now is, "What else can be done?" 
The answer to this question is that there is now a whole new area of 
interest available for investigation. Now that a mathematical model which 
can provide usable measurement data is available, the obvious next step is 
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to use this model to perform sensitivity analysis upon the system. An example 
of this was given when the system was permitted the probability of repair in 
one transition. Through sensitivity analysis, it is possible to study the 
effects upon the system of changing any of the myriad of parameters which 
affect system reliability, maintainability, etc. This provides the oppor-
tunity to obtain a definitive measure of the value of various attributes of 
the system. These measurements are of value in making cost effectiveness 
studies for new systems procurement or for product improvement programs. By 
insuring the maximum benefit is realized for the resources committed, time 
and money can be allocated where the greatest benefits will be realized. 
Another use for the measurement system developed as part of the model 
is in determining priorities for resources when reconstituting a unit after 
damage or destruction of assets due to enemy attack or other causes. By de- 
fining the states of the system to enable the modeler to obtain a measurement 
of the attributes of interest, a quick sensitivity analysis can be performed 
providing to the commander data as to how best to utilize available assets 
to insure this gracefully degrading system operates at as high a state as 
possible. 
This gives rise to a very powerful feature of the Markov model. The 
results obtained from the model are dependent upon the definitions of the 
states of the model as determined by the modeler. The model is flexible in 
that the modeler is able to supply his own definitions for the states to ob-
tain information concerning the parameters of interest to him. This permits 
the model to be used in making an exhaustive study of all aspects of the sys-
tem while retaining the simplicity of being easily understood and the results 
readily available for application. 
In conclusion, the Markov model provides another tool to the analyst, 
and potentially to the user, to enable him to make a better decision based 
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on more available, accurate data. And that, after all, is the purpose of a 
model. 

















Appendix 3: Battery Model, No Repair Authorized 
A - Initial State 
• - Probability of Having a Number of Nodes Operational Given the Initial 
State 
C - Number of Nodes Operational 
D - Probabilities of One-Step Transition from Initial Number of Operational 
Nodes 
E - Number of Nodes Operational After One-Step Transition 
F - State After One-Step Transition 
G Probability of Being in State After One-Step Transition 
C E F G 
0 0 4 .3 1 
0 4 .21 
.7 1 4 .49 
.09 4 .0081 0 
.42 1 4 .0378 
.49 2 3 .0441 





4..:.:: : 189 
.441 2 3 .18522 
.343 3 3 .14406 
.0081 0 4 .003969 
.0756 1 4 .037044 
4 .2646 2 3 .129654 
.4116 3 3 .201684 





































D 	E 	F 	 G 
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0 4 .00072 
1 4 .00852 
2 3 .03969 
3 3 .09261 
4 3 .10806 
,5 2 .05043 
0 4 .00049 
1 4 .00714 
2 3 .04165 
3 3 .12964 
4 3 .22687 
-- -5 2 .21175 
6 2 .08232 
0 4 .00006 
1 4 .00108 
2 3 .00750 
3 3 .02916 
4 3 .06807 
5 2 .09531 
6 2 .07413 
1 .02472 7 
0 4 .00007 
0 4 .00084 
2 3 .007 
3 3 .02869 
4 3 .09527 
2 .15787 5 
6 2 .20755 
7 1 .13839 
8 1 .04032 
Appendix 3 (continued) 
One Step Transition Matrix 
1 2 3 4 
1 .20343 .53486 .25966 .00205 
2 0 .3445 .63863 .01687 
3 0 0 .822367 .177633 
1 
Steady State Equations 
7 = .2034371 
U2 = .5348671 
+ .3445R 2 
R 3 = .2596671 + .638637 2 + .82236773 
74 = .0020571 
+ .016877 2 + .1776337 3 
+ 
74 
71 72 	73 74 = 












B 	C D E F 	G H I 
0 4 .12 
1 4 .18 
0 0 .4 .084 
0 4 .126 .6 	1 
1 1 .4 4 .196 
1 .6-2 3 .294 
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Probability of having a Number of Nodes Operational Given 
State 
Number of Nodes Operational 
Probability of One-Step Transition from Initial Number of 
Nodes 
Number of Nodes Operational After Considering Repair 
Probability of Repair 
Final Number of Nodes Operational with Repair Considered 
State after One-Step Transition with Repair Considered 
Probability of Being in "State" after One-Step Transition 
the Initial 
Operational 

















.027 0 	6 
.1890 	1 .4 
.1890-----1 	.6 
.4410 -----2------i4 
.4410 	2 	.6 
.3430 3 .4 
.3430 	3 	.6 
d/.0081-----0 	.4 
	
.2646 	2 	6 
4116 3 .4 
.4116 	3 	6 
.2401 4 .4 
.2401 	4 	.6 
.0081-----0 .6 
.0756 -----1 	4 
.0756 -----1 6 
.2646 -----2 	4 
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Appendix 4 (continued) 
I 
0 4 .00324 
1 4 .00486 
1 4 .01512 
2 3 .02268 
2 3 .01764 
3 3 .02646 
0 4 .004536 
1 4 .006804 
1 4 .031752 
2 3 .047628 
2 3 .074088 
3 3 .111132 
3 3 .057624 
4 3 .086436 
0 4 .0015876 
1 4 .0023814 
1 4 .0148176 
2 3 .00222264 
2 3 .0518616 
3 3 .0777924 
3 3 .0806736 
4 3 .1210104 
4 3 .0470596 








0 	 1 .6 4 .000432 
1 .4 -1 4 .003408 
1 .6 -2 3 .005112 
2 	4 	2 3 .015876 
2 3 .6 3 .023814 
3 	-3 .4 3 .037044 
3-.6 	4 - 3 .055566 
4 	 4 .4 3 .043224 
4 5 .6 2 .064836 
5 	 5 .4 2 .020172 
5 6 .6 2 .030258 
0 	4 	0 4 .000196 
0 1 .6 4 .000294 
1 	 1 .4 4 .002856 
1 2 .6 3 .004284 
2 	 2 .4 3 .01666 
2 6 	3 3 .02499 
3 	 3 .4 3 .051856 
3 	 4 .5 3 .077784 
3 .090748 4 -----.4----- 4 
4 .6 ----- 5 2 .136122 
5 	4 	5 - • - 2 .0847 
2 .12705 5 -.6-6 
2 .032928 6 -----.4----- 6 
1 .049392 6 -------.6 - 7 
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.0972 	3 .4 
.0972 	3 .6 
A 
\\\\\
.3177 -----5  .4 
.3177 -----5  .6 
.2471 -----6 	.4 
.2471'-----6 .6 
.0824 -----7 	.4 
.0824-7 .6 
.2269-----4 	4 
.2269 -----4 .6 
.0001-----0 	4 






.0467 -----3 .6 
.1361 	4 	.4 
.1361- 4 .6 
.2541 	5 	.4 
.2541 5- .6 
.2965 	6 	.4 
2965-6 .6 
1977 -----7 	.4 
.1977 	 7 .6 
.0576 8 	1 




Appendix 4 (continued) 
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I 
0 4 .000024 
1 4 .000036 
1 4 .000432 
2 3 .000648 
2 3 .003 
3 3 .0045 
3 3 .011664 
4 3 .017496 
4 3 .027228 
5 2 .040842 
5 2 .038124 
6 2 .057186 
6 2 .029652 
7 1 .044478 
1 .009888 7 
8 1 .014832 
0 4 .000028 
1 4 .000042 
1 4 .000336 
2 3 .000504 
2 3 .0028 
3 3 .0042 
3 3 .013076 
4 3 .019614 
4 3 .038108 
3 2 .057162 
5 2 .071148 
6 ---- 2 .106722 
6 2 .08302 
7 1 .12453 
----- 7 1 .055356 
-----8 1 .083034 
-----8 1 .04032 
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(continued) 
One-Step Transition Matrix 
1 	 2 	3 4 
1 .372438 .483856 .142808 .000898 
2 .049392 .489472 .453662 .007474 
3 0 .0705894 .837008 .093402 
4 0 0 .294 .706 
Appendix 4 
















7 2 	73 
+ .0493927 2 
+ .4894727 2 
+ .4536627 2 
+ .0074747 2 
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Appendix 5: Battery-Battalion Model, No Repair Authorized 
A - Initial State of the System 
B - Probability that this Node will Affect State of System, Uniform Distribution 
Equal to 1/n where Equal the Number of Nodes in the System 
C - The Node Number, Each Node Corresponds to a Battery in the System. 
D - The Probability that the Node will have a Certain Number of Communications 
Links Operational. 
E - The Number of Communications Links Operational for Each Node, This 
Determines the State of the System. 
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Appendix 5 (continued) 
A 
	
B 	 C 	 D 	 E 
1/6 
1/6 	 2 
1/6 
1/6 
1/6 5  
1/6 
.09 	 0 
. 42 1 
.49 	 2 
. 09 	 0 
. 42 1 
.49 	 2 
0 
1 
.49 	 2 
.09 	 0 
. 42  1 
. 49 	 2 
3 	
.09 	 0 
. 42  1 
.49 	  2 
.09 	 0 
	 .42 1 
. 49 	 2 
. 027 	  0 
.189 1 
.441• 	 2 
.343  3 
. 027 	 0 
. 189  1 
.441 	  2 







.027 	 0 
1/6 	 3 
.189  1 
. 441 	   2 
.343 3 
.027 	  0 




. 343  3 
. 027 	  0 
.189  1 
. 441 	  2 
.343  3 
.027 	  0 
1/6 	  6 




Appendix 5 (continued) 
One-Step Transition Matrix 
1 2 3 4 
1 .343 .441 .189 .027 
2 0 .49 .42 .09 
3 0 0 .7 .3 
4 0 0 0 1 
Steady State Equations 
7 1 = .3437 1 
7 2 =  
.4417











+ .0972  + .37







+ 74 = 1 
Steady State Probabilities 
7
1 
 = 0 




74 = 1 
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.6 - 	
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Appendix 6: Battery-Battalion Model, Repair Authorized 
A - Initial State of the System 
B - Probability that this Node will Affect State of System, Uniform Distri-
bution Equal to 1/n where n Equal the Number of Nodes in the System 
C - The Node Number, Each Node Corresponds to a Battery in the System 
D - The Probability that a Node Will Have a Certain Number of Links Operational 
in One Transition 
E - The Number of Communications Links Operational for each Node 
F - Probability of Transition from E to G 
G - Number of Communications Links Operational for Each Node when Repair is 
Considered. This defines the State of the Node and System after One 
Transition. 




































4 0 .02 
:6 1 .03 
4 .047 
.07 
• 0 .02 4 
6 1 .03 
1 .047 
4 .6 .07 
.4 0 .02 
1 .03 
.4 1 .047 
.07 2 
.4 0 .02 
:6 1 .03 
.047 
.6 .07 
4 0 .02 
:6 1 .03 
.4 1 .047 





































































-.4 0 0 
1 .6 
.4 1 1 
2 .6 
.4 2 2 
3 6 





















































































































3 1 3 
-4 0 0 
.6 1 
1 4 . 1 
6 2 





.-4 0 0 
.6 1 
.4 1 1 
6 2 



























3 1 3 














Appendix 6 (continued) 
One-Step Transition Matrix 
1 	2 	3 	4 
1 	.6078 	.2898 	.0918 	.0108 
2 	.294 	.4518 	.222 	.036 
3 	0 	.42 	.462 	.12 
4 	0 	0 	.6 	.4 
Steady State Equations 
71 = .607871 + .2947 2 
7
2 = .289871 
 + .451872 + .4273 












71 + 7 2 + 73 + 74 = 1 
Steady State Probabilities 
7
1 
 = .2395324439 
7 2 = .3195395391 
73 = .2517977931 
74 = .1891302239 
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